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Timing of Earnings and Capital Structure
Abstract. This paper shows that asymmetric information about the timing
of earnings can a¤ect corporate capital structure. It sheds some new light
on two following questions: why may protable rms be interested in issuing
equity, and why does debt not necessarily signal a rm quality. These issues
seem to be puzzling from the classical pecking-order theory or signalling theory
point of view. The paper also contributes to the analysis of the link between
debt-equity choice and subsequent performance after issue (short-term versus
long-term) which has been widely discussed in empirical literature but did not
get enough attention in theoretical research.
Keywords: Asymmetric information, Pecking-order theory, Sig-
nalling, Timing of earnings
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1 Introduction
This paper builds on pecking order and signaling theories of capital structure.
These theories directly relate to asymmetric information. The "Pecking-order
theory" (POT) was put forth by Myers and Majluf (1984). According to this
theory rms will use internal funds, if available, to nance protable projects.
In the case that internal funds are not available, they will issue debt. This
creates the "pecking-order" where equity represents an inferior security. The
evidence supports predictions of the pecking order theory such as the negative
correlation between debt and protability (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan
and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2007) and nega-
tive share price reaction on equity issue announcements (Masulis and Korwar,
1986; Antweiler and Frank, 2006). The evidence is mixed about whether rms
always follow a pecking order hierarchy and whether the extent of asymmetric
information reduces the incentive to issue equity (Shayam-Sunders and My-
ers (1999), Frank and Goyal (2003), Fama and French (2002), Lemmon and
Zender (2008), Leary and Roberts (2010), Galpin (2004) and Chen and Zhao
(2004)).
In the pecking order model, good quality rms have to use internal funds
to avoid adverse selection problems and losing value. These rms cannot sig-
nal their quality by changing their capital structure. The signalling theory
of capital structure o¤ers models in which capital structure serves as a signal
of private information (Ross, 1977; Leland and Pyle, 1978). Usually good
quality rms increase leverage to signal quality. The empirical evidence sup-
ports such predictions of signaling theory as a negative market reaction on
leverage-decreasing transactions and a positive reaction on leverage-increasing
transactions excluding debt issues (Masulis, 1980; Antweiler and Frank, 2006;
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Baker, Powell, and Veit, 2003). Second, the evidence does not support a
positive market reaction to debt issues (Eckbo, 1986; Antweiler and Frank,
2006). The negative correlation between debt and protability also contra-
dicts signaling theory. Third, the evidence is mixed regarding the predictions
of signaling theory about rmsoperating performance after issuing equity.
Long-term underperformance of rms issuing equity compared to non-issuing
rms (Jain and Kini, 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 1997) seems to be consistent
with the spirit of signalling theory while better operating performance of rms
issuing equity shortly after the issue compared to non-issuing rms does not
support the theory. According to Jain and Kini (1994, Figure 1) the operating
return on assets is higher for IPO rms in the rst years after the issue and the
operating cash ow on assets is higher in year "0" (immediately after issue).
In Loughran and Ritter (1997) prot margins are higher in years 0 and +1,
although there is di¤erent evidence about operating returns. In Mikkelson,
Partch and Shah (1997, Table 3) IPO rms have higher performance in year
0.
The literature analyzing nancing-investment games where rm insiders
have private information usually deals with situations where rms di¤er in
their qualities or overall intrinsic values. Typically, there are two types of
rms: good (high value) and bad (low value). In the present paper, we analyze
a signaling game where asymmetric information exists about the timing of
earnings rather than the rms overall value. We argue that such a model can
generate predictions which are not explained by existing theories.
Asymmetric information regarding the timing of earnings may take place
because managers often have private information about: 1) the choice of in-
ventory and depreciation methods; 2) estimation of pension liabilities; 3) cap-
italization of leases and marketing expenses; 4) recognition of sales not yet
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shipped; and 5) delay in maintenance expenditures and delays in production.
Financial literature considering the timing of earnings usually emphasizes the
impact on rm value. The typical conclusion is, all other factors being equal,
short-term cash ows lead to a higher rm value than long-term cash ows
("faster is better"). In the present paper, we focus on the link between the
timing of earnings and the incentive to issue particular kinds of securities.
We build a two-stage investment-nancing model where managers, repre-
senting initial shareholders, have a choice between debt (short- and long-term)
and equity. We nd that if information about the timing of earnings is asym-
metric, a separating equilibrium may exist where a rm with late earnings
issues debt and a rm with early earnings issues equity. This equilibrium
implies that rms issuing equity have better operating performance at the
moment of issue or soon after the issue. These rms also have lower operating
performance in the long run. Leverage is negatively correlated with protabil-
ity because rms with higher prots in the rst period issue equity in the rst
period. Firms with low rate of earnings growth issue equity and rms with
high rate of earnings growth issue debt (Mohamed and Eldomiaty, 2008; and
Chichti and Bougatef, 2010).
This paper shows that asymmetric information about the timing of earn-
ings can a¤ect corporate capital structure. It sheds some new light on two
following questions: why may protable rms be interested in issuing equity,
and why does debt not necessarily signal a rm quality. These issues seem
to be puzzling from the classical pecking-order theory or signalling theory
point of view. The paper also contributes to the analysis of the link between
debt-equity choice and subsequent performance after issue (short-term versus
long-term) which has been widely discussed in empirical literature but did not
get enough attention in theoretical research.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a
description of the model, and analyzes optimal nancing under asymmetric in-
formation about timing of earnings without managerial moral hazard. Section
3 analyzes the model with both asymmetric information and moral hazard.
Section 4 presents the model implications and empirical evidence. Section
5 discusses model extensions and robustness and the conclusion is drawn in
Section 6.
2 Model description and some preliminaries
Consider a rm with a two-stage investment project. The rms objective is to
maximize the wealth of initial shareholders (founders), whom we will call the
entrepreneur. In each stage t = 1; 2 an amount b has to be invested. In each
stage, the project can either be successful or unsuccessful. If the former is the
case, the cash ow, rt, equals 1 and if the latter is the case, the cash ow equals
0. In each period, the rm success depends on entrepreneurs e¤ort in that
period, and the rms intrinsic quality in that period. Regardless the level of
entrepreneurs e¤ort, some rms have better short-term earnings potential and
some rms have better long-term earnings potential. The entrepreneurs e¤ort
is ejt. ejt 2 f0; 1g, where j denotes the rms type, j 2 fl; sg. If ejt = 0, the
probability of success for either rm in period t equals 0 and the entrepreneur
gets a private benet equal to c.1 If ej1 = 1, the probability of success in
period 1 equals j1 and if ej2 = 1 the probability of success in period 2 equals
j2. Without loss of generality we assume j1 + j2 = 1. This implies that
1This way of modelling the cost of e¤ort is chosen for simplicity. Alternatively one can
assume that there is some cost for entrepreneur when providing a high e¤ort. Qualitatively,
the results will be similar.
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if the entrepreneur delivers a high e¤ort in both periods, the expected total
cash ow over two periods is the same (equal to unity) for both rm types and
they di¤er only in their timing of expected performances. Further we denote
j the probability of success in period 1 for type j (the probability of success
in period 2 is then 1   j). We assume l < s. It implies that s (stands for
"short-term") has better expected performance in period 1 and l (stands for
"long-term") has better expected performance in period 2.
We assume b < 1=2 with the s restricted to the interval [b; 1   b], which
implies that, conditional on the entrepreneurs high e¤ort, the investment has
non-negative net-present value (NPV) in each period, i. e. the expected cash
ow is at least equal to the amount of investment in period one (b  ) and
in period two (b  1  ). Also we assume
2b > maxf; 1  g (1)
implying that the earnings from only one stage are not su¢ cient to cover the
cost of investment in both stages. If the entrepreneur fails to obtain nancing,
his payo¤ equals 0. If nancing is obtained and the entrepreneur delivers low
e¤ort in period t, the NPV of all benets and costs in stage t is c b. Similarly
if ej1 = 1, the NPV of stage 1 is j   b and if ej2 = 1, the NPV of stage 2 is
1  j   b. We thus assume
c < minf; 1  g (2)
This guaranties that high e¤ort is socially optimal in both periods.
The entrepreneurs choice of e¤ort and private benets are non-observable
and non-veriable. Investors make decisions about providing nancing for the
rm taking into account their beliefs about the rms type and their expec-
tations about entrepreneurs level of e¤ort. The rms prot and its capital
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structure choice are observable and veriable. There exists universal risk-
neutrality in this economy. In addition, the competition among investors is
perfect. This implies zero market prot and risk-neutral valuation of any se-
curity issued.
2.1 Financing strategies
The rm may use stage or up-front nancing, and in both cases it can use
equity or debt.
Equity nancing. In the case of up-front equity nancing (denote this strat-
egy by u), the rm issues equity in the amount of 2b in the rst period. The
rm invests b immediately and keeps b for the second period. Alternatively,
the rm may issue an amount of equity equal to b (denote this strategy by e).
Hence, In the second period, the rm has a choice between internal nanc-
ing (the amount of internal nancing is denoted by f) and external nancing
that is assumed to be debt nancing (the amount of second-period debt equals
b  f).2
Long-term debt (z). The investment has two stages in our model so we
assume that nancing with long-term debt is up-front and the rm cannot
distribute rst-period cash to the shareholders (dividend covenants). This
allows the rm to avoid the debt overhang problem in the second period when
internal funds are not su¢ cient to cover the second-period investment and the
rm has di¢ culty raising second-period nancing in the presence of long-term
claims. Alternative kinds of long-term debt nancing are discussed in Section
2The introduction of possibility for other types of external nancing in the second period
will change nothing in the models main results. It will be shown that in the case of signalling
equilibrium the value of any securities issued in the second period relies heavily on the rms
expected performance in the second period that is the key for main results.
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6.
Short-term debt (d). In this case, the rm gets an amount b from the market
by issuing short-term debt. If d was chosen and the rms prot is not su¢ cient
to repay debt (prot equals 0) then there are two possibilities. First, the rm
may be declared bankrupt. In this case, the shareholders get nothing and the
creditors receive the liquidation value VL = (Er2   b); where 0    1.
This equation shows that the liquidation value is proportional to the expected
prot from the second stage of the project. For instance, if  is low, the cost of
bankruptcy is high, and the liquidation value is low. Alternatively, the rm can
continue to operate. This decision (to continue or to liquidate) is the result of a
renegotiation between the entrepreneur and the creditors (Giammarino, 1989).
The renegotiation is conducted in the following manner: the entrepreneur
makes a "take-it-or-leave-it" o¤er to the creditors; the creditors may accept
or reject the o¤er; if the creditors accept the continuation they get a fraction
of the rms equity; if the o¤er is rejected the rm is liquidated. Note that
if short-term debt is issued, it cannot be up-front: it makes no sense for the
shareholders to keep cash in the presence of senior claims in the following
period. Although there are some other ways of modelling di¤erent kinds of
nancing we believe that those suggested in the paper are very gneral and
more importantly the results about pricing of securities (Lemma 1 below) are
very intuitive. We discuss some other extensions in Section 6.
The sequence of events is illustrated in gure 1. We assume that the rms
type is revealed to the entrepreneur in period 0 while nancing, investment,
and production take place in periods 1 and 2. The rms initial capital struc-
ture is 100% equity, with n shares outstanding. Let t denote the proportion
of equity owned by the entrepreneur in period t (immediately after the issue of
securities in period t, if it takes place). Clearly, 0 = 1. First-period outside
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shareholders (strategies e and u) discover the rms type immediately after
acquiring shares. Since the stages are technologically dependant, if the en-
trepreneur is unable to obtain rst-period nancing there is no investment in
either period and the entrepreneurs utility equals 0.3
-t = 0 t = 1 t = 2s s s
Firms type
is revealed to
the entrepreneur
Entrepreneur chooses
d; e; z or u
Entrepreneur chooses z1
Investment yields r1
If d was played and r1 = 1
the creditors are paid
Shareholders determines
rst-period dividends
If d was played and r1 = 0
the entrepreneur
determines 
If the creditors reject the
o¤er, the rm is liquidated
and the creditors get VL
If external nancing
is needed, the entrepreneur
issues second-period debt
The entrepreneur chooses z2
Investment yields r2
It is distributed
to the claimholders
Figure 1. The sequence of events.
2.2 Symmetric information without moral hazard
This subsection provides: 1) some useful intuitions about benchmark pric-
ing when the market knows the rms type and the entrepreneurs e¤ort is
3Throughout this article we use the concept of Perfect-Bayesian equilibria. In some
cases a complete description of o¤-equilibrium investors beliefs about the rm type can be
ommitted for brevity. They are avilable upon request.
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veriable; 2) formulas which will be utilized throughout this paper. Since
information is symmetric, the choice of nancing is arbitrary: any nancial
structure will lead to a rst-best strategy for the entrepreneur. Since the op-
timal scenario occurs when the rm invests in both stages of the project and
the entrepreneurs e¤ort is high in both periods, the rms total expected cash
ow equals 1. The total amount of investment in the two periods equals 2b,
and given competitive capital markets this sum equals the expected payo¤ to
investors. Thus, the entrepreneurs expected payo¤ is 1  2b regardless of the
nancing strategy, as is usually the case under perfect market conditions. A
bankruptcy never occurs in this case because the rms continuation is Pareto-
e¢ cient. In a renegotiation the creditors will receive the fraction  of rms
equity: this makes them indi¤erent between liquidation and continuation.
Denote the face value of rst-period debt by D1, the second-period debt
face value by D2, the price of issued shares by p, the face value of long-term
debt by L, and the value of the rm for the entrepreneur by V .
Lemma 1 shows that under symmetric information about the timing of
earnings and the absence of moral hazard problem, the value of the rm for
entrepreneur equals 1 2b (total expected earnings if the entrepreneur delivers
a high level of e¤ort minus the cost of investment). It also explains the pricing
of securities under symmetric information.
Lemma 1. Under symmetric information without moral hazard:
p =
1  2b
n
(3)
D1 =
b  (1  )(1     b)

(4)
D2 =
b  f
1   (5)
L =
2b
1   + 2 if b 
1   + 2
2
(6)
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L =
2b  2 + (1  )2
(1  ) if b >
1   + 2
2
(7)
V = 1  2b (8)
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Note that p depends only on the rms total prot and not on its prot
prole over time. This result is not surprising when using equity nancing
(strategy u or e) since total cash ow is the same for both types when the
entrepreneurs e¤ort is high in both periods. It follows from (4)-(7) that: 1) the
face value of short-term debt is negatively linked to the expected performance
in the rst period, and positively related to both the amount of borrowing
and the cost of bankruptcy, which decreases in  as mentioned earlier; 2) if
 is su¢ ciently low, the face value of short-term debt depends more heavily
on rst-period performance than on second-period performance; 3) conversely,
second-period short-term debt only depends on second-period performance;
and 4) the value of long-term debt depends on both rst-period and second-
period performance. For example, if the cost of investment is relatively small
(eq. (6)) and the rm is solvent when total earnings over both periods equals
1 or 2, the face value of long-term debt is positively linked to the amount of
nancing over both periods, and inversely related to the probability of solvency
over both periods.
2.3 Asymmetric information without moral hazard
Consider the situation with asymmetric information about the rms type but
without moral hazard, i.e. let us assume that the entrepreneur always delivers
a high e¤ort.
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Proposition 1. If there is no moral hazard, strategy u is a rst-best pooling
equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the situation where both rm types play u and use internal
nancing for the second stage. Also, if a rm uses external nancing for stage
2, the market believes that the rm is s. From (3) 1 = nn+2b=p = 1  2b. Since
both types use internal nancing for stage 2, total dividends equal r1 + r2.
Thus, the entrepreneurs expected payo¤ is 1E(r1 + r2) = 1  2b since total
expected cash ow for each rm is equal to 1. According to equation (8), this
is equal to the rst-best rm value for the entrepreneur. If l deviates and
borrows in the second period it su¤ers from the fact that it will be perceived
by the market as type s. Type s is indi¤erent between internal nancing and
borrowing in the second period because the interest rate would correspond to
type s according to market beliefs described above. This situation constitutes
an equilibrium. End Proof.
The idea behind this proposition was discussed in the introduction. Ac-
cording to (3), in an environment without moral hazard, the share price in
the rst period is the same for all rm types: this completely eliminates the
problem of asymmetric information under up-front nancing. l can nance the
second stage of the project internally, thereby avoiding the lemon problem. If
s attempts to borrow in the second period the market will correctly realize
the rms type, e¤ectively eliminating its ability to earn informational rents
in this period.4
4For more information regarding this case see Miglo and Zenkevich (2006). Up-front
nancing is not allowed in that paper.
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3 Asymmetric information with moral hazard
In this case, the valuation of securities issued by the rm is based on the
markets belief about the entrepreneurs e¤ort. If investors believe the entre-
preneurs e¤ort will be low, they will either reduce the share price, increase the
interest rate charged, or refuse to nance the project. The investorsbeliefs
are based on their calculation of the entrepreneurs incentives. Therefore, the
choice of nancing should send a credible signal to the market about the en-
trepreneurs e¤ort level. However, some agency costs will arise under all types
of nancing. Under equity nancing, agency costs arise because the entrepre-
neurs fraction of equity is reduced, decreasing the incentive to provide high
e¤ort. Under short-term debt nancing, agency costs arise when default occurs
in the rst period and creditors obtain a high fraction of equity, reducing the
incentive for entrepreneurial e¤ort in the second period. Agency costs may
also arise if the face value of debt is excessively high, leading the entrepreneur
to provide low rst-period e¤ort. Similarly, under long-term debt nancing the
problem may appear when rst-period earnings are low, and the entrepreneurs
payo¤ for high e¤ort in the second period is diluted by the creditors claims.
In order to nd an equilibrium in the model with both asymmetric infor-
mation and moral hazard we will rst establish some preliminary results. We
know from previous section that u is optimal nancing under asymmetric in-
formation without moral hazard. With moral hazard the entrepreneurs e¤ort
depends on private benets from low e¤ort. If these benets are small, the low
e¤ort will be chosen and vice versa. The following lemma shows the conditions
under which u is the rst-best nancing (i. e. the entrepreneurs e¤ort is high
in both periods) when information about the rms type is symmetric.
Lemma 2. When information about rms type is symmetric, the entre-
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preneurs e¤ort is high in both periods under strategy u if and only if
  1=2 and (1  2b)  c (9)
or
 > 1=2 and (1  2b)(1  )  c (10)
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 imply that when both asymmetric information
and moral hazard are presented, a rst-best equilibrium can exist if the cost of
low e¤ort is su¢ ciently high, or the private benets from low e¤ort are small.
Comparing conditions (9) and (10) for each type leads us to the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. Strategy u is a rst-best pooling equilibrium if and only
if: 1) l > 1=2 and c  (1  2b)(1  s); 2) l  1=2 < s and c  minf(1 
2b)(1  s) ,(1  2b)lg; and 3) s  1=2 and c  (1  2b)l.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Next we consider situations where the equilibrium described in Proposition
2 does not exist. These are:
l > 1=2 and c > (1  2b)(1  s) (11)
l < 1=2 < s and c > minf(1  2b)(1  s); (1  2b)lg (12)
s < 1=2 and c > (1  2b)l (13)
3.1 E¢ cient separating equilibria
An equilibrium is e¢ cient if nancing is obtained for both stages, the entre-
preneurs e¤ort is high in both periods (respecteively, the incentive constraints
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should hold for both rm types in each period) and his expected payo¤ equals
1  2b.
The general intuition concerning the role of asymmetric information in our
model is as follows. The prices of securities can be a¤ected by the lemon
e¤ect in both periods.5 Intuitively, l would seem to have an informational
advantage in the rst period: lower prots in this period mean that this type
of rm can capitalize on the adverse selection problem. On the other hand,
in the second period, the informational advantage passes to s. We show that
l and s face very di¤erent incentives regarding nancial decisions. The point
is that the price of rst-period equity is type-independent because both types
face the same total prot over the two periods. As a result, if l were to issue
equity in the rst period, they would always be mimicked by s: s stands to
gain in the second period by being perceived as growing and, therefore, as
expecting high prots in the second period. The implication is that l is at
a disadvantage for issuing equity in the rst period. This is the main engine
driving the results of this article.
To signal its type, l can issue short-term debt. In particular, if the cost
of bankruptcy is high enough (or when non-recourse debt issued), rst-period
interest rates will be relatively high compared to second period rates, since l
is considered badin the rst period and goodin the second. Given such
an interest rate prole, we show that if s issues short-term debt, it will be
benecial to creditors, but not to the rm. This is because creditors benet
in the rst period due to high interest rates and the fact that s does well in
that period.
The analysis below develops the above ideas but rst we argue that u is
5We use the term "lemon" to describe a situation where private information leads to the
underpricing of a "good" type. See Akerlo¤ (1970) for a classical example.
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never played in an e¢ cient signaling equilibrium. Recall that in an environ-
ment without moral hazard, upfront equity is a good strategy because it can
mitigate problems related to asymmetric information about timing of earnings
(Proposition 1). The result holds when there is moral hazard but its extent
is relatively small (Proposition 2). If pooling with u is not an equilibrium
described in Proposition 2, the private benets from low e¤ort are relatively
high for at least one rm type (conditions (11)-(13)). Even if for one rm type
private benets are low and he can use u, these benets will be high for the
other rm type (which does not play u in equilibrium). Therefore, that type
will mimic the type playing u. Since the rst-period share price is always 1 2b
n
(type-independent), it will not su¤er from the adverse selection problem, but
will gain by providing low e¤ort. We thus have the following result.
Proposition 3. u is never played in an e¢ cient signalling equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Proposition 3 is consistent with Neher (1999). This paper argues that
upfront nancing is less important (and respectively stage nancing is more
important) when the entrepreneurial moral hazard problem becomes more
important. The author also discusses empirical evidence consistent with this
prediction.
Let us analyze other strategies. Let Vx(;b) be the entrepreneurs nal
payo¤ if strategy x is played, the rm is of type  but is perceived as type b,
given a high e¤ort in both periods.
Lemma 3: Ve(s; l) > 1  2b and Ve(l; s) < 1  2b:
Proof. See Appendix 5.
The idea behind Lemma 3 is that when e¤ort is high in both periods, the
rst-period share price is type-independent as follows from (3). Because the
rst-best share price in period one is the same for all types, s benets from its
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informational advantage in the second period (when it is really a lemon).
This implies that an e¢ cient separating equilibrium where l plays e does not
exist. The analysis below develops this idea.
Proposition 4. An e¢ cient separating equilibrium where l plays e does
not exist.
Proof. Suppose the opposite is true: that such and equilibrium exists. By
Lemma 3, the payo¤ to s if it mimics l is greater than 1  2b because s > l.
End proof.
Now consider strategy z. The di¢ culty involved in l separating itself by
playing z is similar to the case of strategy e. Since the value of long-term
debt depends on rms performance in both periods and the values of both
types (under high e¤ort in both periods) are equal, then intuitively, l does not
have an advantage when issuing long-term debt. This leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 5. An e¢ cient separating equilibrium where l plays z does
not exist.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
Let us turn to strategy d.
Proposition 6. The set of parameters for which Vd(s; l) < 1  2b is not
empty.
Proof. The following is an example proving the proposition:  = 0 and
l < 1=2. First note that when s mimics l it will never use internal nancing
in the second period because the second-period interest rates for type l are
advantageous given the high performance of this type in the second period.
Thus,
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Vd(s; l) = s(1  b
l
) + (1  s)(1  b
1  l ) (14)
This means that the probability that r1 = 1 equals s. Since the rm is
perceived as type l, the debt face value is b
l
(see (4)). Hence, the entrepreneurs
rst-period expected earnings are s(1  bl ). The reasonning is similar in period
2.
From (14) we have:
Vd(s; l) < 1  2b, s
l
+
1  s
1  l > 2, (15)
(l)  s(1  l) + (1  s)l   2l(1  l) > 0; (16)
where  is convex with roots l = 1=2 and l = s. Therefore Vd(s; l) < 1=2
if l < 1=2. [Note that since (16) is strictly positive, Proposition 6 may hold
when  > 0 ( is su¢ ciently small) by continuity6] End proof.
Intuitively, by analogy with the perfect information case (see the remarks
in Section 3 about the value of short-term debt for the case when  is suf-
ciently low), a downward sloping interest rate prole (l < 1=2) is suitable
for performance-improving rms and not for rms with a lower rate of prot
growth (s > l), which are better o¤with upward sloping interest rate prole.
Corollary 1. The only e¢ cient separating equilibrium which may exist,
where both debt and equity are issued, is one where l plays d and s plays e.
Proof. It follows from Propositions 3-6 that the only candidate for an
e¢ cient separating equilibrium is one where l plays d and s plays e. An
6Also note that inequality (14) is one of the most interesting and technically sound results
of our research.
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example is the situation where  is su¤ciently small or equal 0, l < 1=2 < s
and c > minf(1  2b)(1  s); (1  2b)lg. First-best pooling equilibrium with
u does not exist as follows from (12), l does not mimick s by Lemma 3 and s
does not mimick l as follows from the proof of Proposition 6. End proof.
3.2 Other separating equilibria with debt and equity
From the previous subsection we see that rms issuing equity (s) have a lower
rate of prot growth than rms issuing debt (l). This is of interest when we
explain the long-term afterissuing underperformance of rms issuing equity.
The problem, with our analysis thus far, is that we have not considered an
ine¢ cient separating equilibria. The general intuition regarding this equilibria
is as follows. If both types invest only in the rst stage of the project and
provide high e¤ort in that period (the issued claims will obviously depend
only on the rst-period expected performance), l will mimic s (recall that s is
the low prot type in this period). A situation where a rm only invests in the
second stage is impossible because the stages are technologically dependant.
Thus, at least one type will invest in both stages, provide high e¤ort in the
rst period, and provide high e¤ort in the second period when r1 = 1 (and
possibly when r1 = 0). Otherwise, the investors will be unable to provide
nancing for both periods because cash from only one period is insu¢ cient to
cover the total investment, by (1). In equilibrium, l is unable to use strategy
e and invest in both stages since it will be mimicked by s. This leads to the
following proposition:
Proposition 7. The only ine¢ cient separating equilibriums which may
exist, where both debt and equity are issued, are the following: 1) l plays d
and invests in both stages (high e¤ort in both stages) and s plays e, invests in
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the rst stage, and provides high e¤ort in that stage; 2) l plays z and invests
in both stages (high e¤ort in the rst stage and also in the second stage when
r1 = 1) and s plays e and invests only in the rst stage; and 3) s plays z
and invests in both stages (high e¤ort in the rst stage, and also in the second
stage when r1 = 1) and l plays e and only invests in the rst stage.
Proof. See Appendix 7.
One can see from Proposition 7 that in any equilibrium a rm issuing equity
has lower performance in the second period relative to a rm issuing debt.
4 Implications and empirical evidence
This paper sheds some new light on discussions related to the following issues.
(i) Firms issuing equity underperform in the long-run as compared to non-
issuing rms. First, let us summarize the analysis of the model. When the
cost of entrepreneurial e¤ort is relatively low, up-front nancing is the op-
timal strategy. Otherwise, a separating equilibrium may exist where rms
issuing equity have higher performance in the rst period and lower perfor-
mance in the second period than rms issuing debt. This equilibrium means
that rms issuing equity underperform in the long-run as compared to non-
issuing rms (measured as a decline of prot, prot to assets ratio or prot
per share). This is implied by Corollary 1 and Proposition 6: only the types
with higher rst-period expected prot and lower second period prot issue
equity in the rst period. This conclusion is conrmed by empirical ndings
(see for example Jain and Kini (1994), Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1995),
Cai and Wei (1997), Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997)) or Purnanandam and
Swaminathian (2004) for IPO rms and Loughran and Ritter (1997) for SEO
(seasoned equity issues) rms. Also some recent papers found that rms with
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low rate of earnings growth issue equity and rms with high rate of earnings
growth issue debt (Mohamed and Eldomiaty, 2008; and Chichti and Bougatef,
2010).
(ii) The performance of rms issuing equity exceeds the performance of the
non-issuing rms at the time of issue. The paper provides a new theoretical
result that have hitherto not been tested. The model predicts that the per-
formance of rms issuing equity exceeds the performance of the non-issuing
rms at the time of issue (or in the near future after issue). In the equilibrium
described in Corollary 1 and in 2 of the 3 equilibria from Proposition 7 the
following holds: the absolute performance of rms issuing equity exceeds the
performance of non-issuing rms at the time of issue, or in the near future
after issue. While this point was not the main focus of the empirical research
cited above, some authors did stress the point that issuing rms outperform
non-issuing rms just before issue, and others documented that issuing rms
outperform non-issuing rms in the year of issue and in the rst year after
issue (Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997) and Jain and Kini (1994)).
(iii) A new motive for issuing equity. This paper suggests a new motive for
issuing equity (Corollary 1 and Proposition 7) that has not been explored in
existing literature. When the rm knows that it will be high-protable in the
near future and low-protable in the long-term, the entrepreneur may want to
issue equity. An alternative interpretation is that equity should be issued when
asymmetric information exists regarding the timing of earnings. Possible tests
of these predictions will be based on identifying rms and industries with high
degree of asymmetric information regarding the timing of earnings. One can
use the spread in analystsvaluations of rmsshares as a proxy for the extent
of asymmetric information regarding the rmstotal values and the spread in
the forecasts of future earnings (long-term spread versus short-term spread)
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as a proxy for asymmetric information about future rates of earnings growth.
Also rms manipulating earnings prior to issue (as in Theo et al, 1998) can
be seen as ones with high degree of asymmetric information about timing of
earnings since earnings management can often be seen as a redistribution of
earnings between periods rather than accounting fraud (Degeorge, Patel and
Zeckhauser (1999), Miglo (2010)).
5 The model extensions and robustness
Mixed nancing. Allowing mixed nancing provides little usefulness for the
analysis of operating performance of rms issuing equity versus that of non-
issuing rms. The reason is that most empirical literature on this topic does
not di¤erentiate issuers according to fractions of equity in capital structure.
Even a marginally small issue of shares puts a rm into the category of issuing
rms. Thus it will be hard to interpret the equilibrium in terms of existing
empirical evidence. However, allowing for mixed nancing is important with
regard to the conclusions about the negative correlation between debt and
protability and more interestingly about the conditions of existence of this
phenomena which constitute an addition to the literature on this phenomena.
The main results of the model are robust when the possibility of mixed
nancing is allowed. The main insight that rms with an increasing prot
prole are at a disadvantage when issuing equity while stagnating rms can
"hide" their low second-period performance by issuing equity (the price of
which is type irrelevant), holds under mixed nancing. We can show that if
an equilibrium exists where rms with higher second-period performance issue
more equity, then there also exists a separating equilibrium where these rms
issue less equity, but not vice versa. Thus, the latter equilibrium prevails (see
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analogous reasoning in Goswami, Noe and Rebello, 1995).
Long-term debt. Alternative ways of modelling long-term debt do not a¤ect
the paper main result. Suppose, for example, that in the rst period a rm
may issue long-term debt Dz which should be repaid in the second period.
Consider symmetric information case and suppose that second-period debt
is senior (or both debts have the same priority). Since rst-period prot is
distributed in total as dividend, the only source of payo¤ for both rst-period
and second-period creditors is the rms second-period prot (only when it
equals to 1). It implies,
Dz +D
2
z  1 (17)
where D2z denote the second-period debt face value. Also we have (analogously
to (5))
D2z = b=(1  ) (18)
Expected payo¤ of rst-period creditors equals Dz(1  ). Since it should be
equal to b we have
Dz = b=(1  ) (19)
However, when   1   2b (18) and (19) contradict (17). In other words the
rm may not be able to obtain second-period nancing at all. Other scenarios
(di¤erent priority of debts, for example) also imply some conditions which
cannot be feasible. This means that long-term debt may not dominate equity
as it automatically happens, for example, in Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995).
Di¤erent prot distribution functions. Now we briey comment on the
models robustness with respect to possible generalizations of projectsprot
distribution functions.7 For example, one can consider situation where rm
prots are ordered by rst-order dominance. One can show that the basic
7Recall that we use the Bernoulli function in the model.
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results such as propositions 1, 3, 4 and 5 and Lemma 3 hold. This provides an
idea why growing types avoid playing equity with subsequent conclusions about
operating performance of rms issuing equity. In addition intuitively, if interest
rate prole is downward sloping (growing economy) stagnating rms will prefer
equity and otherwise they will prefer debt. However, since, rst of all, Vd
becomes non-linear, the determination of exact conditions for the existence of
di¤erent types of equilibrium, especially for the case of multiple type economy
become very di¢ cult technically. Nevertheless, numerical calculations for some
classes of distribution functions conrm the results found in this paper.
Firms di¤er in their overall values. In the model, di¤erent types of rm
have the same overall values and di¤er only in their timing of earnings. An
interesting extensions is related to the situation where rms di¤er not only in
their timing of earnings but also in their total values. To illustrate the main
idea and to show that the main result of the article may still hold, suppose
that the rms are of two types, type s and type l, with respective probabilities
of success st and lt in stage t. Suppose a type s issues equity for each
stage of investments and distributes period 1 earnings as dividends. In stage
2, investors require a fraction of equity 2 such that: 2s2 = b. In stage 1,
investors require a fraction 1 of equity such that: 1s1 + 1(1  2)s2 = b.
Now consider the payo¤ of shareholders of l in case decides to mimic s. This
equals (1  1)l1 + (1  1)(1  2)l2. If a signaling equilibrium exists, the
shareholderspayo¤ for type l is l1 + l2   2b (the true value of l). Thus, a
separating equilibrium exists if (1 1)l1+(1 1)(1 2)l2  l1+l2 2b.
This can be simplied to:
s1 + s2   2b
l1 + l2   2b <
s1 + s2   b
l1 + l2(1  b=s2) (20)
If the extent of asymmetric information regarding rms total values is
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su¢ ciently small and if s1 > l1 and s2 < l2, then (20) holds. In an extreme
case, for example, when s1+ s2 = l1+ l2, Equation (20) becomes s2 < l2.
Here, the value of shares in period depends on the rms total value and not
on the rms performance in a particular period, while the value of shares in
period 2 depends on period 2s performance. The rm with low overall value
can benet from overvaluation in period 1 but can have a loss from period
2 undervaluation. When asymmetric information about a rms overall value
is relatively small and information about the timing of earnings is high, the
latter e¤ect can dominate.
The separating equilibrium described above implies that rms issuing eq-
uity have better operating performance at the moment of issue or soon after
the issue as in the basic model. These rms also have lower operating per-
formance in the long run. Leverage is negatively correlated with protability
because rms with higher prots in the rst period issue equity.
Multiple types. For simplicity the basic model had two types of rms.
Our analysis shows that the results may hold even in a multiple types en-
vironment.8 Let the distribution of types be exponential truncated: f() =
K exp( ),9where  is the expected prot in the rst period. Let y is the
average rst-period prot in the economy. High y corresponds to a stagnating
economy (low second period prot) and a low y indicates a growing economy.
Theoretically possible equilibria are: semi-separating, pooling with debt or
pooling with equity. If the equilibrium is semi-separating, rms with  < 
issue debt and rms with  >  issue equity. This equilibrium is consistent
with our results since it implies that the avaerage rst-period performance of
8It is wellknown that calculations become singicantly more complicated in that case.
9Where K = 
e b e (1 b) . K is a constant that allows us to keep the cumulative
probability equal to 1.
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rms issuing equity is higher that that of non-issuing rms. The results of
numerical analysis are presented in the Table below.
Table 1. Equilibrium with multiple types.
The density of types is f() = K exp( ) where  is the expected prot in the rst pe-
riod. y is the average rst-period prot in the economy. High y corresponds to a stagnating
economy (low second period prot) and a low y indicates a growing economy. Theoreti-
cally possible equilibria are: semi-separating, pooling with debt or pooling with equity. If
several equilibriums exist, the one with minimal mispricing is chosen. If the equilibrium is
semi-separating, rms with  <  issue debt and rms with  >  issue equity.
a) b = 0:4
 < 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 20
y > 0:5 0:5000 0:4934 0:4868 0:4805 0:4744 0:4687 0:4463
(1   y)=y, econ-
omy rate of
growth
< 1 1:0000 1:0270 1:0542 1:0813 1:1079 1:1336 1:2408
equilibrium type pooling with
debt
separating
 - 0:5999 0:5594 0:5396 0:5297 0:5198 0:5099 0:4703
1   F (), pro-
portion of rms,
issuing equity
0:0 0:0005 0:1720 0:2230 0:2262 0:2276 0:2288 0:2310
b) b = 0:25
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 < 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 20
y > 0:5 0:5000 0:4590 0:4217 0:3905 0:3657 0:3466 0:3000
(1   y)=y, econ-
omy rate of
growth
< 1 1:0000 1:1786 1:3711 1:5610 1:7347 1:8851 2:3336
equilibrium type pooling with
debt
separating
 - 0:7499 0:5750 0:4875 0:4250 0:3750 0:3376 0:2876
1   F (), pro-
portion of rms,
issuing equity
0:0 0:0002 0:2439 0:2907 0:3158 0:3559 0:4126 0:4715
6 Conclusions
This paper examines optimal nancing in a dynamic setting (two-stage invest-
ment process) under asymmetric information. The analysis is based on the
idea that rms have private information about their prot proles over time.
It is shown that separating equilibria may exist separating equilibrium may
exist where rms issuing equity have higher performance in the rst period
and lower performance in the second period than rms issuing debt. The pa-
per contributes to POT by explaining why rms can issue equity as a signal.
It contributes to signalling theory by explaining why debt does not necessar-
ily signal a rm quality. The paper suggests an explanation for why rms
issuing equity underpeform (operating underperformance) non-issuing rms
in the long run. It also provides new insights on important capital structure
phenomena, such as the negative correlation between debt and protability.
To our knowledge, this is the rst attempt to simultaneously explain all of
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these phenomena. Finally, this paper provides some new theoretical results
which have not yet been tested. These are: 1) the decision about the issuance
of standard securities, such as debt and equity, can be a¤ected by the private
information about timing of earnings; 2) rms issuing equity have higher per-
formance shortly after the issue; and 3) up-front nancing is less likely (stage
nancing is more likely) when moral hazard problem is important.
Appendix 1
Equity nancing. Denote the total amount of funds raised in the rst
period by b1; b1 2 fb; 2bg, the number of shares issued by n, the dividend per
share in period t by wt, total dividend in period t by Wt, and cash retained
in period t (analogous to being invested in zero coupon bonds) by mt. The
equilibrium relationships are:
1) rst-period total investment equals rst-period total nancing:
b1 = pn (21)
b1 = b+m1 (22)
2) market valuation of shares (share price equals expected dividends per
share):
p = E(w1 + w2) (23)
3) total dividend in period t:
W1 = w1(n+n) (24)
W2 = w2(n+n) (25)
4) earnings in period t:
r1 +m1 = W1 + f +m2 (26)
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maxfm2 + r2  D2; 0g = W2 (27)
First-period earnings (the sum of cash or investment in zero-coupon bonds
in period 1 and cash ow from the project) can be used to pay out dividends,
nance the second stage of the project, or invest in zero-coupon bonds in
period 2. On the other hand, second-period earnings are distributed, in total,
to the shareholders.
5) market valuation of second-period debt (recall that the rm raises b  f
externally in the second period):10
b  f = Eminfm2 + r2; D2g (28)
Using equations (22), (24), (25), (26), (27), (28) and the identity
min(X; Y ) + max(0; X   Y ) = X (29)
with X = m2 + r2 and Y = D2, we can transform (23) into:
p =
Er1 + Er2   2b+ b1
n+n
This equation together with (21) produces
p =
1  2b
n
(30)
10Further, we assume for brevity that D2 > 0 which implies m2 = 0. Note that no results
are a¤ected by this assumption. To see this, suppose that D2 > 0 and 0 < m2 < b   f .
Then D2 =
b f m2
1  . The entrepreneurs second-period expected payo¤ is V2 = (1  )(1+
m2   b f m21  ) = 1      b + f +m2. Now suppose that the entrepreneur invests m2 in
the second stage of the project. Then D2 =
b f m2
1  and the entrepreneurs expected payo¤
equals V 02 = (1  )(1  b f m21  ) = 1     b+ f +m2 = V2. The idea is analogous for the
case m2 > b  f .
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For second-period debt, we get from (28) that:
D2 =
b  f
1   (31)
Long-term debt. L is determined by the following equation:
2b = Eminfm2 + r2; Lg (32)
Recall that long-term debt is issued with dividend covenants. Therefore, the
rm uses its initial resources to nance the second stage, and must invest
rst-period earnings in zero-coupon bonds. We can thus rewrite (32) as:
2b = Eminfr; Lg
where r denotes the rms total cash ow over the two periods. Note that r
equals 2 with probability (1 ), equals 1 with probability 2+(1 )2 and 0
otherwise. Two cases are possible. If L  1 the probability that the creditors
get the face value equals the probability that r1 + r2  1. Otherwise they get
nothing. Thus:
2b = (1   + 2)L (33)
If L > 1, we have
2b = (1  )L+ 2 + (1  )2 (34)
Short-term debt. Denote the face value of rst-period debt by D1. We have
the following relationship:
b = Eminfr1; D1g+ Pr(r1 < D1)EW2 (35)
Equation (35) takes into account the fact that creditors receive the fraction
 of equity when rst-period cash ow is insu¢ cient to pay short-term debt.
This equation can be rewritten as
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b = D1   (1  )E(W2 j r1 < D1) (36)
If r1 < D1 (default), f = m2 = 0. Using (27), (28) and (29) with X = r2 and
Y = D2 we get:
E(W2 j r1 < D1) = 1     b (37)
(36) and (37) imply
D1 =
b  (1  )(1     b)

(38)
Finally, note that regardless of how the investment is nanced, the value
of the rm for the entrepreneur is:
V = 1  2b (39)
For example, if equity is issued the entrepreneurs expected payo¤ equals:
1E(m1 + r1   f  m2 +max(0;m2 + r2  D2)) (40)
where
1 =
n
n+n
(41)
From (21), (30) and (41) we have
1 =
1  2b
1  2b+ b1 (42)
Taking into account (22), (42) and (29) with X = m2+ r2 and Y = D2 we get
that (40) equals 1  2b.
Appendix 2
The second-period incentive constraint (IC) is
2Emaxfm2 + r2  D; 0g  c+ 2Efm2  D; 0g (43)
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where D denotes the total face value of debt in the second period. The left
side of (43) shows the entrepreneurs expected payo¤ if e2 = 1 and the right
side shows his payo¤ if e2 = 0. If D > 0 thenm2 = 0 and (43) can be rewritten
as
2Emaxfr2  D; 0g  c (44)
IfD = 0 then (43) becomes: 2E(m2+r2)  c+2Em2 which also corresponds
to (44). Note that the left side of (44) depends on the rst-period dividend
policy. If rst-period dividends are high, the rm will borrow more in the
second period and the IC will be stronger. The entrepreneurs optimal decision
is to invest as much as possible with internally generated funds given that both
investment in the second period and high e¤ort are socially optimal by (2).
If the second-period IC holds and the entrepreneur provides a high e¤ort
in the rst period, the entrepreneurs expected payo¤ equals the rst-best rm
value which is equal to 1  2b by (39). Therefore, the rst-period IC is
1  2b  c+ E[1W1 + 2W2 j e1 = 0] (45)
Under strategy u the rm is always able to nance the second stage of the
project internally. Thus, D = 0 in (44) and the second-period IC is:
2Er2  c (46)
Given that r1 = W1 = 0 when rst-period e¤ort is low, we can rewrite (45)
as
1  2b  c+ 2Er2 (47)
From (42) 1 = 2 = 1  2b and we can rewrite (46) and (47) as:
(1  2b)  c (48)
(1  2b)(1  )  c (49)
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If a rm has a growing prot prole, the consequences of entrepreneurial
moral hazard are less pronounced in the rst period because the expected prot
from high e¤ort is relatively low, and visa versa for the other type. Formally,
if   1=2 the rst condition is stronger.11 On the other hand if  > 1=2 the
second condition is stronger. Hence we have: u is optimal if and only if
  1=2 and (48) or  > 1=2 and (49) (50)
Appendix 3
Proof. If s  1=2 then from (50) u is the rst-best strategy for each
type when c < (1   2b)j; j = l; s. Proposition 2 follows from s > l. If
l > 1=2 then, from (50) u is the rst-best strategy for both types if c < (1 
2b)(1  j); j = l; s. Again, Proposition 2 follows from s > l. Now consider
s > 1=2  l. From (50) u is feasible for both types if c < (1 2b)(1 s) and
c < (1   2b)l. Note that in all cases, the o¤-equilibrium beliefs supporting
these equilibria can be the same as those described in the previous proposition.
End proof.
Appendix 4
Proof. Suppose the opposite is true, such that an equilibrium exists where
l plays u. First-period IC
c < (1  2b)l
From (11)-(13) this is only possible when l > 1=2 or l < 1=2 < s and
c > (1  2b)(1  s) (51)
The latter implies that if s mimics l and cheats (provides low e¤ort) in the
second period, its total payo¤ is (1 2b)s+c and this is greater than 1 2b by
11Obviously, if  = 1=2 both conditions are equivalent.
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(51). Thus s will mimic l and such an equilibrium does not exist. The proof
is analogous for the case when s plays u. End proof.
Appendix 5
Proof. Consider Ve(l; s). From Lemma 1, p = 1 2bn and 1 =
1 2b
1 b .
Recall that l nances internally if r1 = 1. Thus
Ve(l; s) =
1  2b
1  b (l(1  b+ 1  l) + (1  l)
2(1  b
1  s )) (52)
Lemma 3 follows from l < s and (52). The proof is analogous for
Ve(s; l). End proof.
Appendix 6
Let L() denote the perfect information face value of long-term debt if the
rm is of type , assuming that z is a rst-best strategy for  under symmetric
information (it would invest in both periods and provide high e¤ort in both
periods).
Lemma 5. L(s)
>
=
<
L(l) if s + l
<
=
>
1:
Proof. L(s) and L(l) are both less than 1. Otherwise, a high e¤ort will
not be provided in the second stage when r1 = 0. Thus, Lemma 3 follows
directly from (33). End proof.
Corollary 1. 1) Vl(s; l)
>
=
<
1   2b If s + l
<
=
>
1; 2) Vl(l; s)
>
=
<
1   2b if
s + l
>
=
<
1.
Proof. Suppose s + l < 1 and consider Vl(;b). This is equal to:
Vl(s; l) = s(1  s)(2  L(l)) + (2s + (1  s)2)(1  L(l))
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By Lemma 3
Vl(s; l) > s(1 s)(2 L(s))+(2s+(1 s)2)(1 L(s)) = Vl(s; s) = 1 2b
This proves the rst part of the corollary. The proof is analogous for the
second part. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider a separating equilibrium where l plays l
and s plays e. Then from (33) L = 2b
1 l+2l
. Suppose that l + s < 1. In this
case s will mimic l by Corollary 2. Thus:
l + s > 1 (53)
which implies s > 1=2. From (11), (12) and (53) we get c > (1  2b)(1  s).
Now consider the IC of type s in the second period. From (3) p = 1 2b
n
and 1 = nn+b=p =
1 2b
1 b : Type s earns 1   s   b in the second period. The
entrepreneur will provide a high e¤ort only if c < (1 2b)(1 s b)
1 b . However, this
contradicts the condition c > (1  2b)(1  s). End proof.
Appendix 7.
l plays e and s plays d. If l provides a high e¤ort in both periods it will
be mimicked by s because of the "lemon" argument (Lemma 2). Consider the
case when l only obtains rst-period nancing (and provides a high e¤ort in
this period). We have:
b = pn (54)
p =
l
n+n
(55)
(54) and (55) imply p = l b
n
and 1 =
l b
l
. The equilibrium payo¤ of l is
obviously l b. Suppose that s provides a high e¤ort in the rst period. Then
D1 =
b (1 s)(1 s b)
s
. If l mimics s it has at least l(1   bs ) > l   b. Thus,
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such a situation is impossible. Now if s provides low e¤ort in the rst period
and is subsequently liquidated, the entrepreneur gets c. The IC for l is
c < l   b (56)
If s mimics l it gets l b
l
s > l   b > c (its equilibrium payo¤). The latter
inequality follows from (56). Thus such an equilibrium is impossible.
The cases where l or s provide low e¤ort in the rst period and high e¤ort
in the second period are impossible. The rms total earnings are 1  ; which
is less than the total investment by (1). The last observation also holds for
the situations considered below.
l plays e and s plays z. Consider the case when l only obtains rst-period
nancing (and provides high e¤ort in this period). The situation where the
e¤ort of s is high in the rst period and low in the second (under both cash-ow
realizations), or its e¤ort is low in the rst period and high in the second are
impossible by (1): the earnings from only one stage are not su¢ cient to cover
the total cost of investment (2b). Now suppose that s provides high e¤ort in
both periods. The incentive constraint for l is given by (56). If l+s > 1, then
l mimics s and gets a higher payo¤ than its equilibrium payo¤ by Corollary 1.
Consider l + s < 1. It implies l < 1=2. From (12) and (13) c > (1  2b)l.
The latter contradicts (56). The only possible case where s provides high e¤ort
in the rst and second periods is when r1 = 1.
l plays z and s plays e. The case when the e¤ort of l is high in the
rst period and low in the second, under both states, is impossible given the
previous argument. Now consider the case when l provides high e¤ort in both
periods provided r1 = 1. The payo¤ to l equals 2l   2l   2b + c(1   l).
Suppose that s exerts high e¤ort in both periods. In this case, l will mimic
s. l will provide high e¤ort in the second period only if r1 = 1; and will get
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1 2b
1 b (l(1  b+1  l))+ c(1  l). This is more than his payo¤ in equilibrium.
Thus, l will deviate. Finally, the only possible cases are those where s obtains
nancing for the rst period and provides high e¤ort in that period, and where
l provides a high e¤ort in both periods provided that r1 = 1.
l plays d and s plays e. First consider the following case: s provides
high e¤ort in both periods and l provides high e¤ort only in the rst period.
We have p = 1 2b
n
. If l mimics s and provides low e¤ort in the second period
it gets 1 2b
1 b l + c which is more than its equilibrium payo¤ of l   b. Now
consider the case when both types provide high e¤ort in the rst period and
low e¤ort in the second period. We have p = s b
n
. Hence, l mimics s, and
gets s b
s
l > l   b.
Finally, note that strategy u does not play an important role. If u is played
in equilibrium then by (1) the e¤ort should be high in both periods. However,
such a situation is impossible given that (11)-(13) should hold (analogously to
Proposition 3). End Proof.
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